United Nations S/2001/884

Security Council

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Letter dated 18 September 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention once again to the letter (S/2001/694) whereby the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported the intention of Rwanda and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma) to create a secessionist State in the eastern provinces occupied by Rwanda, and to inform you that this plan to dismember the Democratic Republic of the Congo has entered its implementation phase.

On Sunday, 16 September 2001, the so-called RCD-Goma rebels dared to appoint members of what they term "provincial assemblies" aimed at establishing federalism in the Congolese territories occupied by Rwanda.

My Government wishes to recall that in July 2001, RCD-Goma had described its structures as those of a "State" and had announced plans to establish federalism pursuant to a resolution contained in the founding instrument of this so-called rebel movement established on 14 August 1998.

It is regrettable and distressing to note, that RCD-Goma still has in its ranks some extremist and hard-core elements whose goal is to commit terrorist acts against the valiant Congolese people and to perpetuate the occupation of their country with a view to implementing the Machiavellian plan to establish a secessionist State in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, against the will of the Congolese people, which achieved national concord on 30 June 1960; by so doing, they will sanction the de facto partition of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in favour of Rwanda.

This hidden agenda of Rwanda and RCD-Goma was drawn up in violation of the founding principles of the charter of the Organization of African Unity regarding the inviolability of the borders that emerged from decolonization, and in violation also of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as of the relevant provisions of all the resolutions of the Security Council, which have all reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of all States of the region.

Moreover, it constitutes a serious violation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed on 10 July, 20 July and 31 August 1999 in Lusaka, the relevant resolutions of the Security Council concerning the inter-Congolese dialogue, the Declaration on Fundamental Principles signed in Lusaka on 4 May 2001 by the parties signatory to the above-mentioned Agreement, as well as of the act of commitment that sealed the

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republican pact signed on 24 August 2001 in Gaborone by representatives of the parties to the inter-Congolese political talks.

In view of the foregoing, my Government reiterates its call on the Security Council to address a strong, clear and unambiguous message to Rwanda and RCD-Goma to refrain from any action that could sanction the secession and the partition of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

My Government further calls upon the Security Council to ensure, including through the promotion and adoption of confidence-building measures in the entire Great Lakes region, that Rwanda and its leaders, as well as the leaders of RCD-Goma, do not create obstacles to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Lastly, with respect to the general framework for restoring lasting peace to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, my Government calls on the Security Council to fully assume its responsibilities and to:

1. Adopt a wide range of measures aimed at putting an end to the massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed in the occupied Congolese provinces;

2. Take, as a matter of urgency, all appropriate measures for the demilitarization of Kisangani in accordance with resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000 and all subsequent resolutions on this serious question;

3. Demand that Rwanda and RCD-Goma demilitarize Kisangani and its environs in accordance with resolutions 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000 and 1355 (2001) of 15 June 2001;

4. Ensure the strict application to Rwanda and RCD-Goma of the measures provided for by Articles 39 to 42 of the Charter of the United Nations and by paragraph 28 of resolution 1355 (2001), should they continue to refuse to demilitarize Kisangani in accordance with the deadline set by the Security Council;

5. Provide firm support for the inter-Congolese dialogue and ensure that it is free from any external interference, open, representative and inclusive;

6. Take action on the call by the Political Committee for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement at its twelfth meeting held in Kigali to complete the second phase of the deployment of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and to begin the third phase concerning the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation or resettlement of the armed groups as well as the definitive and orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

7. Take into account, when designing and planning the third phase of the deployment of MONUC, of the need to guarantee the stability and security of the Democratic Republic of the Congo after the withdrawal of foreign troops.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Atoki **Ileka**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Items 8 and 178 of the provisional agenda*

Security Council
Fifty-sixth year

Adoption of the agenda and organization of work

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Identical letters dated 17 September 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I write to convey my Government's appreciation for the expressions of sympathy and support that were contained in the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions passed last week in connection with the terrorist attacks of 11 September. I found particularly moving the comment, made by many, that all the diplomatic community experienced this tragedy "as New Yorkers". And, as New Yorkers, they shared in our grief over the loss not only of those working in the World Trade Center buildings but of so many valiant firefighters, police and rescue team members.

The United States Mission has received many inquiries from members of the international community about how interested individuals and delegations can help — in addition to the formal offers of support the United States has gratefully received from many Governments. In that regard, I would ask that the present letter and the attached article (see annex), which appeared in the 13 September *New York Times*, be distributed as a document of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Although by no means exhaustive, it contains a useful list of organizations collecting donations for the victims of the 11 September tragedy. Additionally, www.helping.org contains links by web to a number of reputable relief organizations. I also welcome the General Assembly's proposal, approved by acclamation, that the United Nations hold a blood drive, as an act of solidarity with its host city.

(*Signed*) James B. **Cunningham**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/56/150.

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Annex to the letter dated 17 September 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

CHARITY

How to Help The Neediest Of Cases

By AARON DONOVAN

The New York Times Company announced yesterday that it had begun a special campaign to raise money for the victims of the attack on Tuesday of the World Trade Center.

In the wake of the attack, blood banks in the city have been swamped, and many people have expressed a desire to help by giving money.

This special campaign is intended to help families of the victims, said Jack Rosenthal, president of The New York Times Company Foundation, which created the fund and each year runs an appeal for The New York Times Neediest Cases Fund, a charity that provides money to seven social service agencies in the city.

"For 90 years, The New York Times has conducted an annual Neediest Cases campaign to relieve desperate need among the poor," Mr. Rosenthal said. "Here suddenly is an unprecedented calamity that creates desperate need among a large number of people and we thought it only appropriate to do what we could to help relieve that need."

That need comes in many forms. In some cases, parents have been killed. The first concern of the Children's Aid Society, which provides poverty relief and foster care services for children in New York City, is finding children who have been made orphans by the attack and finding temporary care for them, said Philip Coltoff, executive director of the agency.

"There are children out there who have been left parentless," Mr. Coltoff said. "Particularly those children who just had one parent to start with." Mr. Coltoff said that he did not yet have an idea of how many children had been orphaned. But, he said, "We know it's going to be a substantial number."

This special campaign, the first in the history of The Neediest Cases Fund, will collect money until Oct. 11. It will be called The New York Times 9/11 Neediest Fund, to differentiate it from the annual Neediest Cases appeal, which is scheduled to begin Nov. 1.

Money raised by the campaign will go to the seven New York charities supported each year by the Neediest Cases Fund to help those injured in the attack or the families of those who died. The campaign will also support three foundations that aid New York City firefighters, police officers and sanitation workers — the New York City Fire Safety Foundation, the New York City Police Foundation and the John Jay College of Criminal Justice Foundation.

In the past, the Fire Safety Foundation has provided firefighters with special respiratory and other equipment. The John Jay Foundation will aid the Department of Sanitation and other agencies, said Gerald W. Lynch, the chairman of those two foundations.

Agency heads said that while they were swamped with need on a scale they had not seen before, they were impressed by the generosity that New Yorkers have shown. "We have had lots of calls from people who want to do something. 'Can I give blood?' 'Can I help?' 'Can I give money?' " Dr. Lynch said. "It's very important to have this terrible tragedy have a positive aspect."

A special campaign for the attack's victims.

HOW TO HELP

Checks payable to The New York Times 9/11 Neediest Fund should be sent to P.O. Box 5193, General Post Office, New York, N.Y. 10087, or any of these organizations:

BROOKLYN BUREAU OF COMMUNITY SERVICE
285 Schermerhorn Street
Brooklyn, N.Y. 11217

CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK
1011 First Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

CATHOLIC CHARITIES, DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN AND QUEENS
191 Joralemon Street
Brooklyn, N.Y. 11201

CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY
105 East 22nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10010

COMMUNITY SERVICE SOCIETY OF NEW YORK
105 East 22nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10010

FEDERATION OF PROTESTANT WELFARE AGENCIES
281 Park Avenue South
New York, N.Y. 10010

JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION
899 Tenth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10019

NEW YORK CITY FIRE SAFETY FOUNDATION
555 West 57th Street
New York, N.Y. 10019

NEW YORK CITY POLICE FOUNDATION
345 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10154

UJA-FEDERATION OF NEW YORK
Church Street Station
P.O. Box 4100
New York, N.Y. 10261-4100

Donations may be made with a credit card online, courtesy of CharityWave.com, an Internet donations service.

No agents or solicitors are authorized to seek contributions for The New York Times 9/11 Neediest Fund.

The Times pays the fund's expenses, so all contributions go directly to the charities, which use them to provide services and cash assistance.

Contributions to the fund are deductible on federal, state and city income taxes to the extent permitted by law.

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Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in the Central African Republic pursuant to the statement by the President

I. Introduction

1. In the statement by its President dated 17 July 2001 (S/PRST/2001/18), the Security Council requested me to submit to it by 30 September 2001 recommendations on how the United Nations might further contribute to the economic recovery of the Central African Republic and to the strengthening of the role of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), particularly in the areas of the judicial system, institution-building, enhancing the effectiveness of its early-warning capabilities and human rights. This report is submitted pursuant to that request.

II. Background

2. In my third report to the Security Council on the situation in the Central African Republic, dated 2 July 2001 (S/2001/660), I stressed that the attempted coup d'état of 28 May 2001 had seriously destabilized the political, economic, social and security situation in the Central African Republic. It has also seriously jeopardized the international community's efforts to restore and consolidate peace in the Central African Republic. The country is now in a situation of crisis that requires immediate and increased levels of external assistance.

3. The Government of the Central African Republic conveyed this message to General Lamine Cissé, my new Representative in the Central African Republic and Head of BONUCA. Upon assuming his functions, my Representative and Special Envoy to the Central African Republic, General Amadou Toumani Touré, confirmed the seriousness of the current situation.

4. The situation in the Central African Republic since the failed coup attempt has been marked by sharp political tensions, further economic decline, simmering social tension and a troubling lack of security. One of the consequences of the failed coup, for which the leader of the main opposition party claimed responsibility, is that political dialogue no longer seems to be on the agenda. The repercussions of the fighting in the capital have been disastrous for the economy, which, since mid-August, has suffered from the World Bank's suspension of disbursements for non-payment of amounts due. As a result of these financial difficulties, the State is unable to pay the salaries of its public servants on a regular basis. Lastly, in the area of security, the flight to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the chief instigators of the coup attempt and a large number of soldiers poses a serious threat to peace and stability in the country. This fear is all the more justified as these rebel forces will not hesitate to manipulate the civilian populations which, out of fear, have taken refuge on the other side of the border.

5. It is for this reason that any solution to the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo must take into account the situation in the Central African Republic. Because of its strategic geographic situation, the Central African Republic's stability is threatened by the proliferation of weapons in the subregion and in areas adjacent to the region of Equateur that are under the control of the Front de libération des Congolais (FLC) of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba.

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6. The refugee problem is another illustration of the close connection between the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the situation in the Central African Republic. While large numbers of refugees from Chad, the Congo (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo), Rwanda and the Sudan have long been present in the Central African Republic, there are now refugees from the Central African Republic in the Republic of the Congo (1,250 at Betou) and many more in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (approximately 20,000 at Zongo, on the opposite side of the river from Bangui). The presence of presumed putschists among the refugees is a matter of legitimate concern for the Central African authorities, who closed the common border between the two States on 17 July 2001. For all of these reasons, the problem of security in the Central African Republic should be dealt with in conjunction with the question of the restoration of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, more generally, in the general context of stability in the subregion.

7. At the domestic level, the situation is gradually returning to normal. The investigation being undertaken by the Government into the killing of the security coordinator for the United Nations system is following its course. Also, the security guarantees given by the authorities have convinced nationals of the Central African Republic who had taken refuge in embassies (of France and the United States of America) or who were in hiding after the attempted coup d'état to come out. However, the flight of Mrs. Kolingba, on 24 August, followed by the arrest of the Minister of Defence, on 25 August, had provoked sharp tensions, which have now eased somewhat. At the political level, one of the repercussions of the attempted coup was the cabinet reshuffle that took place on 30 August. In the area of human rights, the situation is gradually improving, with a reduction in the number of exactions, reports of which had been frequent in the aftermath of the failed coup.

8. In the economic and military spheres, the Government drew up in succession an emergency humanitarian plan (estimated to cost 2.5 billion CFA francs, or approximately US$ 3.6 million), a minimum plan of action for social and economic recovery (estimated at 56 billion CFA francs, or approximately US$ 75 million) and a resettlement and assistance plan for returning refugees and displaced persons (estimated at 12 billion CFA francs, or US$ 17 million). In the social sphere, dialogue was resumed with the trade unions within the framework of the Monitoring and Arbitration Committee.

9. The response of the international community is not yet commensurate with the challenges faced by the country. While some bilateral partners, the United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations have already provided considerable support in the humanitarian field, much still remains to be done for economic recovery in the Central African Republic.

III. Recommendations

A. Assistance for economic recovery in the Central African Republic

10. The structural poverty that exists in the Central African Republic, which was exacerbated by the repercussions of the mutinies of 1996-1997 and then by the recent coup attempt, imposes a duty of solidarity on development partners and the international community. This solidarity should take the form of diversified assistance, in the short and medium terms, in the areas of human resources, training, economic assistance, security and institutional strengthening.

11. In the area of human resources, the system of governance that has existed thus far did not permit the most efficient use to be made of all the country's available skills. Moreover, the recruitment freeze necessitated by structural adjustment programmes has led to a severe shortage of managers in the public service, most of whose members are now nearing the age of retirement. This is why the Central African Republic should be provided in the medium term with support for the training of managers to fill the vacancies created by retirements. However, for the immediate future, the international community should make available to the Central African Republic the skills that it needs in the areas of public administration and finance with a view to improving the administrative and financial management of the State, whose institutional weaknesses are evident. I therefore recommend that development partners second high-level experts (administrators, economists, financial specialists, accountants) to the Government of the

Central African Republic, which stands ready to establish this partnership in support of its own efforts.

12. The purpose of these specialists in administration and finance would be to support the authorities in their efforts to restructure services, improve their performance and, in particular, to increase the revenues of the State and ensure a more effective allocation. The secondment of experts to the financial authorities, among other initiatives, should be accompanied by immediate institutional support for computerizing the various departments of the Ministry of Finance (treasury, taxes, State-owned property, customs, collections, revenue and debt services, central services). To this end, the Government has just submitted a priority request for an amount of 390 million CFA francs (approximately US$ 550,000). The computerization of the Ministry of Finance is of critical importance to the Central African Republic's goal of achieving the financial soundness that is required for it to obtain the resources it needs to ensure social peace in the country. The development partners of the Central African Republic in general and the Bretton Woods institutions in particular might wish to give favourable consideration to this request.

13. Because of the weakness of its administrative and technical institutions, the State has been unable to access the credits made available by donors. The Central African Republic still has unused credits amounting to 20 million euros (approximately US$ 16 million) from the sixth, seventh and eighth European Development Funds. The Government is therefore requesting that these credits be carried over so that some of them can be allocated to urgent and priority social expenditures. In this connection, it is encouraging to note that an agreement was reached to apply these unused credits towards the programming of the ninth European Development Fund. This programming, which has just been finalized jointly with the Government, includes the social sectors. My Representative at Bangui has indicated that the Commission is willing to strengthen its cooperation with the Central African Republic.

14. The Central African Republic has considerable economic potential which its current situation has prevented it from exploiting. It is, however, prepared to welcome all foreign investors, as the recent adoption of a new investment code by the Parliament shows. The State is also requesting its partners to provide support for the training of economic operators, in other words, entrepreneurs who can help to develop the country's mineral, forestry and agricultural resources. The Government would welcome assistance for the modernization of the agricultural sector in order to relieve overcrowding in Bangui and thus create poles of development in the country's interior. I therefore urge development partners to take advantage of these opportunities over the medium term.

15. The Central African Republic is also seeking assistance from the international community in the medium term for the implementation of its decentralization policy, especially in the form of support for the organization of local elections, which have not yet been held, despite the establishment of democracy in 1993. The advent of local democracy will increase the likelihood that the democratic process will succeed in the Central African Republic. I therefore encourage all interested countries and institutions to lend their active support to the Central African authorities in this area.

16. In the statement by its President dated 17 July 2001 (S/PRST/2001/18), the Security Council stressed the crucial importance of poverty eradication, debt payment and payment of arrears of salary for civil servants. In the current situation, the Central African Republic is utterly incapable of meeting these formidable challenges. In order to do so, it will need immediate and substantial external assistance. Its partners will have to show exceptional solicitude towards the Central African Republic. Echoing the very timely appeal made by the Security Council, I encourage the Bretton Woods institutions to take into account the specific nature of the case of the Central African Republic in the negotiations and implementation of programmes with the Government, which has committed itself to strict and effective economic and financial management and to the implementation of the necessary structural reforms.

17. Security is another priority area in the assistance to the Central African Republic in its recovery efforts. The attempted coup d'état increased insecurity in the country. The number of illegally owned weapons — the collection of which was far from being completed when the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) ended — has increased sharply as a result of the events of 28 May. There is now such a proliferation of light weapons in Bangui and in the provinces that incidents of armed robbery in the capital and attacks on the highways in the interior

of the country are more frequent. In order to ensure that security and peace are restored in the Central African Republic, it is absolutely essential to assist the Government in its efforts to collect arms and to implement its redeployment plan. I invite the different partners to assist the State agencies responsible for disarmament, whose performance has been far from effective due to a lack of resources. Such assistance could take the form of:

(a) Financial assistance to compensate owners of illegal weapons;

(b) Provision of experts in disarmament;

(c) Assistance for the redeployment plan.

18. Assistance to the Central African Republic in the area of security also encompasses the restructuring of the defence and security forces. The appointment of a Minister responsible for restructuring following the cabinet reshuffle of 30 August 2001 underlines the priority that the authorities assign to this question. It should be recalled that not all the pledges made at the special donor meeting in New York in May 2000 have been honoured. I would like to take this opportunity to thank those States that have already fulfilled their commitments. Like the Security Council, I call upon the other partners who had made similar commitments to honour them. The situation in the Central African Republic calls for the continued and improved restructuring of the armed forces in order to create a climate that would enable them to fulfil their role under the Constitution of the Republic and to promote the establishment of lasting peace in the country. Bilateral and multilateral donors might therefore wish to assist the Central African authorities to:

(a) Rehabilitate existing military facilities and build new barracks;

(b) Redeploy units to the interior of the country, including through the provision of light duty vehicles;

(c) Recruit, train and equip at least two contingents to make up for the shortage of military personnel since the events of 28 May.

19. Assistance to the Central African Republic in the area of security also concerns the police and gendarmerie which, like the army, must be given substantial support. The shortcomings of these forces in the area of staffing, training, methods of work and respect for the law partly explain the prevailing insecurity in Bangui and in the provinces, as well as the human rights violations that are frequently reported to the Office. If the Central African Republic is to be successful in its efforts to promote the rule of law, then its police force and gendarmerie must have acceptable working conditions. That is why I wish to encourage, in this respect also, all partners concerned to provide special assistance to the authorities:

(a) Through diverse forms of logistical support (teaching equipment and miscellaneous materials for training schools; rehabilitation of infrastructure);

(b) Through financing the initial training of 200 police officers and 200 gendarmes.

20. Owing to the linkage between the restoration of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and stability in the Central African Republic, I wish to draw the Council's attention to the subregional dimension of the situation in the Central African Republic. That is why I have requested my representatives in Kinshasa and Bangui to continue to work closely together by exchanging information, and taking joint and any other initiatives likely to promote the restoration of peace and security in this part of the continent.

21. Assistance should also be provided to the media of the Central African Republic. Both the public- and private-sector media suffer from a crucial lack of resources, which considerably hampers their vital role in a democratic system. Specifically, the training programmes already being implemented by BONUCA should be strengthened through logistical support from bilateral and multilateral partners aimed at enabling the Central African media to carry out their tasks properly.

B. Strengthening of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic

22. In requesting me to submit recommendations to it, the Council asked me to pay particular attention to the strengthening of BONUCA. Due to the prevailing situation in the country since the attempted coup d'état, consideration needs to be given to strengthening the mandate of the Office in order to enhance its effectiveness and the visibility of its activities by increasing its resources and capabilities, strengthening its administrative capacities and making available to

the Office a level of resources commensurate with its revised mandate.

23. With regard to the strengthening of its activities, the Office, in cooperation with agencies of the United Nations system in the country, will pursue its overall mission of peace-building. In that regard, and in the light of recent events, it will focus on:

(a) Bringing about political dialogue and national reconciliation;

(b) Monitoring the security situation;

(c) Ensuring respect for and the promotion of human rights;

(d) Providing political support for the mobilization of resources with a view to the economic reconstruction of the country.

24. The lack of political dialogue created a situation of permanent tension which was aggravated by the attempted coup d'état. In that regard, the Office should play a more active role in efforts to bring the ruling majority and the opposition closer together with a view to strengthening democratic institutions.

25. As a result of the climate of insecurity in the capital and elsewhere in the country, as well as other indicators of instability, the activities of BONUCA should be reviewed and strengthened in order to enable it to have a genuine early-warning capacity. Moreover, the Office will play a catalytic role in the collection of arms, restructuring of the army and training of military personnel alongside other agencies of the system, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which will be responsible for implementing the redeployment plan.

26. The attempted coup d'état adversely affected the human rights situation. There have been constant reports to the Office of serious violations of human rights, including violations of the right to life. The flood of requests received by the human rights section during and after the events of 28 May sharply highlighted the limited resources of BONUCA in the area of human rights monitoring and investigation of individual cases. In that regard, the strengthening of the Office's mandate should lead to strengthening of its investigation and training activities and to the extension of these activities within the country and assistance to the Central African judicial system and assistance from the United Nations system and other partners. In this regard, the human and financial resources of the Office should be considerably increased. The budget of BONUCA for next year, which I will be presenting to the General Assembly, will reflect this increase.

27. As far as support for the economic recovery of the Central African Republic is concerned, the Council stressed in the statement by its President dated 17 July 2001 the crucial importance of poverty eradication and the need for an enhanced international effort to help in the recovery of the Central African Republic. The role of BONUCA in this context will consist of pursuing, together with the resident coordinator of the United Nations system, efforts to mobilize resources. In that regard, the relations of the Office with the representatives of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank should be more interactive, especially with respect to institutional support for public administration and the Central African financial departments.

28. In the light of these proposals, I wish to propose to the Council that the mandate of BONUCA be strengthened. The principal mission of the Office will be to support the efforts of the authorities and of other sectors of Central African society to achieve national reconciliation and create a political environment that is conducive to peace and development. To this end, its activities will be aimed at promoting political dialogue and cooperation between Government authorities and civil society with a view to strengthening the nation's democratic institutions. The Office will also advise and provide technical assistance to the Government in the areas of security and restructuring of the defence forces. With the assistance of other agencies of the United Nations system, it will also play an active role in promoting disarmament. In addition, it will pay special attention to the human rights situation and, lastly, take appropriate initiatives and provide every possible political assistance to other initiatives for mobilizing the resources needed to achieve economic recovery and combat poverty.

29. In the light of the foregoing and within the framework of a global peace-building strategy adopted by the agencies of the United Nations system represented in the Central African Republic, I propose that the mandate of BONUCA, as set out in the letter dated 3 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the Security Council (S/1999/1235) and

the statement by the President of the Security Council dated 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/5), should be:

(a) At the political level, to:

(i) Monitor the political situation in the country;

(ii) Support initiatives and efforts aimed at strengthening national unity and promoting national reconciliation and, to this end, provide the necessary support for the effective implementation of the provisions of the 1998 National Reconciliation Pact and the effective functioning of the Monitoring and Arbitration Committee;

(iii) Together with the Government, political parties and civil society, work towards the strengthening of democratic institutions and, to this end, take such steps as are needed to advance the democratic process in the Central African Republic;

(iv) Contribute to the political and social dialogue and, to this end, use its good offices, offer its services as a mediator, if necessary, and strengthen national capacities in the area of the prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes.

(b) In the area of security, to:

(i) Monitor the military and security situation in the country;

(ii) Support any initiative to promote the restructuring of the defence and security forces and to support the national development and redeployment plan;

(iii) With the assistance of other agencies of the United Nations system, promote the implementation of an effective arms-collection programme;

(iv) Implement, for the benefit of the armed forces, a programme of education for a culture of peace and respect for the institutions of the Republic;

(v) Contribute to the mobilization of the external resources needed for the restructuring of the defence and security forces and for the redeployment of interested military personnel.

(c) In the area of civilian police, to:

(i) Monitor the public security situation in the country;

(ii) Support the efforts of the Government to provide training for the national police and gendarmerie;

(iii) Provide technical assistance to the competent police and gendarmerie authorities in the area of public order and crime control;

(d) In the area of human rights, to:

(i) Monitor the human rights situation through observation, investigation and judicial assistance to victims;

(ii) Contribute to national capacity-building in the area of respect for and promotion of human rights through implementation of human rights education and training programmes targeted to all sectors of society, including law enforcement officers both in the capital and in the interior of the country;

(iii) Support the activities of United Nations agencies and other partners aimed at strengthening the judicial system and the rule of law.

(e) In the area of economic recovery, to:

(i) Provide, within the framework of a global peace-building strategy, political support for the efforts of the Resident Coordinator and United Nations agencies to promote national reconstruction, combat poverty and promote good governance;

(ii) Contribute actively to the international mobilization of political support and the necessary resources for the implementation of the social and economic programmes agreed upon with the Bretton Woods institutions.

30. Should the members of the Council approve these new tasks and the proposals made for strengthening BONUCA, I suggest that the mandate of the Support Office be extended for an additional year. The current mandate will expire on 31 December 2001. Unless the Council requests otherwise, I will continue to keep its members informed by submitting every six months a report on developments in the situation in the Central African Republic, in accordance with the statement by

the President of the Council dated 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/5). The next report on the activities of BONUCA will be submitted to the Security Council in December 2001.

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Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the situation in the Central African Republic pursuant to the statement by the President

I. Introduction

1. In the statement by its President dated 17 July 2001 (S/PRST/2001/18), the Security Council requested me to submit to it by 30 September 2001 recommendations on how the United Nations might further contribute to the economic recovery of the Central African Republic and to the strengthening of the role of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), particularly in the areas of the judicial system, institution-building, enhancing the effectiveness of its early-warning capabilities and human rights. This report is submitted pursuant to that request.

II. Background

2. In my third report to the Security Council on the situation in the Central African Republic, dated 2 July 2001 (S/2001/660), I stressed that the attempted coup d'état of 28 May 2001 had seriously destabilized the political, economic, social and security situation in the Central African Republic. It has also seriously jeopardized the international community's efforts to restore and consolidate peace in the Central African Republic. The country is now in a situation of crisis that requires immediate and increased levels of external assistance.

3. The Government of the Central African Republic conveyed this message to General Lamine Cissé, my new Representative in the Central African Republic and Head of BONUCA. Upon assuming his functions, my Representative and Special Envoy to the Central African Republic, General Amadou Toumani Touré, confirmed the seriousness of the current situation.

4. The situation in the Central African Republic since the failed coup attempt has been marked by sharp political tensions, further economic decline, simmering social tension and a troubling lack of security. One of the consequences of the failed coup, for which the leader of the main opposition party claimed responsibility, is that political dialogue no longer seems to be on the agenda. The repercussions of the fighting in the capital have been disastrous for the economy, which, since mid-August, has suffered from the World Bank's suspension of disbursements for non-payment of amounts due. As a result of these financial difficulties, the State is unable to pay the salaries of its public servants on a regular basis. Lastly, in the area of security, the flight to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the chief instigators of the coup attempt and a large number of soldiers poses a serious threat to peace and stability in the country. This fear is all the more justified as these rebel forces will not hesitate to manipulate the civilian populations which, out of fear, have taken refuge on the other side of the border.

5. It is for this reason that any solution to the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo must take into account the situation in the Central African Republic. Because of its strategic geographic situation, the Central African Republic's stability is threatened by the proliferation of weapons in the subregion and in areas adjacent to the region of Equateur that are under

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the control of the Front de libération des Congolais (FLC) of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba.

6. The refugee problem is another illustration of the close connection between the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the situation in the Central African Republic. While large numbers of refugees from Chad, the Congo (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo), Rwanda and the Sudan have long been present in the Central African Republic, there are now refugees from the Central African Republic in the Republic of the Congo (1,250 at Betou) and many more in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (approximately 20,000 at Zongo, on the opposite side of the river from Bangui). The presence of presumed putschists among the refugees is a matter of legitimate concern for the Central African authorities, who closed the common border between the two States on 17 July 2001. For all of these reasons, the problem of security in the Central African Republic should be dealt with in conjunction with the question of the restoration of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and, more generally, in the general context of stability in the subregion.

7. At the domestic level, the situation is gradually returning to normal. The investigation being undertaken by the Government into the killing of the security coordinator for the United Nations system is following its course. Also, the security guarantees given by the authorities have convinced nationals of the Central African Republic who had taken refuge in embassies (of France and the United States of America) or who were in hiding after the attempted coup d'état to come out. However, the flight of Mrs. Kolingba, on 24 August, followed by the arrest of the Minister of Defence, on 25 August, had provoked sharp tensions, which have now eased somewhat. At the political level, one of the repercussions of the attempted coup was the cabinet reshuffle that took place on 30 August. In the area of human rights, the situation is gradually improving, with a reduction in the number of exactions, reports of which had been frequent in the aftermath of the failed coup.

8. In the economic and military spheres, the Government drew up in succession an emergency humanitarian plan (estimated to cost 2.5 billion CFA francs, or approximately US$ 3.6 million), a minimum plan of action for social and economic recovery (estimated at 56 billion CFA francs, or approximately US$ 75 million) and a resettlement and assistance plan for returning refugees and displaced persons (estimated at 12 billion CFA francs, or US$ 17 million). In the social sphere, dialogue was resumed with the trade unions within the framework of the Monitoring and Arbitration Committee.

9. The response of the international community is not yet commensurate with the challenges faced by the country. While some bilateral partners, the United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations have already provided considerable support in the humanitarian field, much still remains to be done for economic recovery in the Central African Republic.

III. Recommendations

A. Assistance for economic recovery in the Central African Republic

10. The structural poverty that exists in the Central African Republic, which was exacerbated by the repercussions of the mutinies of 1996-1997 and then by the recent coup attempt, imposes a duty of solidarity on development partners and the international community. This solidarity should take the form of diversified assistance, in the short and medium terms, in the areas of human resources, training, economic assistance, security and institutional strengthening.

11. In the area of human resources, the system of governance that has existed thus far did not permit the most efficient use to be made of all the country's available skills. Moreover, the recruitment freeze necessitated by structural adjustment programmes has led to a severe shortage of managers in the public service, most of whose members are now nearing the age of retirement. This is why the Central African Republic should be provided in the medium term with support for the training of managers to fill the vacancies created by retirements. However, for the immediate future, the international community should make available to the Central African Republic the skills that it needs in the areas of public administration and finance with a view to improving the administrative and financial management of the State, whose institutional weaknesses are evident. I therefore recommend that development partners second high-level experts (administrators, economists, financial

specialists, accountants) to the Government of the Central African Republic, which stands ready to establish this partnership in support of its own efforts.

12. The purpose of these specialists in administration and finance would be to support the authorities in their efforts to restructure services, improve their performance and, in particular, to increase the revenues of the State and ensure a more effective allocation. The secondment of experts to the financial authorities, among other initiatives, should be accompanied by immediate institutional support for computerizing the various departments of the Ministry of Finance (treasury, taxes, State-owned property, customs, collections, revenue and debt services, central services). To this end, the Government has just submitted a priority request for an amount of 390 million CFA francs (approximately US$ 550,000). The computerization of the Ministry of Finance is of critical importance to the Central African Republic's goal of achieving the financial soundness that is required for it to obtain the resources it needs to ensure social peace in the country. The development partners of the Central African Republic in general and the Bretton Woods institutions in particular might wish to give favourable consideration to this request.

13. Because of the weakness of its administrative and technical institutions, the State has been unable to access the credits made available by donors. The Central African Republic still has unused credits amounting to 20 million euros (approximately US$ 16 million) from the sixth, seventh and eighth European Development Funds. The Government is therefore requesting that these credits be carried over so that some of them can be allocated to urgent and priority social expenditures. In this connection, it is encouraging to note that an agreement was reached to apply these unused credits towards the programming of the ninth European Development Fund. This programming, which has just been finalized jointly with the Government, includes the social sectors. My Representative at Bangui has indicated that the Commission is willing to strengthen its cooperation with the Central African Republic.

14. The Central African Republic has considerable economic potential which its current situation has prevented it from exploiting. It is, however, prepared to welcome all foreign investors, as the recent adoption of a new investment code by the Parliament shows. The State is also requesting its partners to provide support for the training of economic operators, in other words, entrepreneurs who can help to develop the country's mineral, forestry and agricultural resources. The Government would welcome assistance for the modernization of the agricultural sector in order to relieve overcrowding in Bangui and thus create poles of development in the country's interior. I therefore urge development partners to take advantage of these opportunities over the medium term.

15. The Central African Republic is also seeking assistance from the international community in the medium term for the implementation of its decentralization policy, especially in the form of support for the organization of local elections, which have not yet been held, despite the establishment of democracy in 1993. The advent of local democracy will increase the likelihood that the democratic process will succeed in the Central African Republic. I therefore encourage all interested countries and institutions to lend their active support to the Central African authorities in this area.

16. In the statement by its President dated 17 July 2001 (S/PRST/2001/18), the Security Council stressed the crucial importance of poverty eradication, debt payment and payment of arrears of salary for civil servants. In the current situation, the Central African Republic is utterly incapable of meeting these formidable challenges. In order to do so, it will need immediate and substantial external assistance. Its partners will have to show exceptional solicitude towards the Central African Republic. Echoing the very timely appeal made by the Security Council, I encourage the Bretton Woods institutions to take into account the specific nature of the case of the Central African Republic in the negotiations and implementation of programmes with the Government, which has committed itself to strict and effective economic and financial management and to the implementation of the necessary structural reforms.

17. Security is another priority area in the assistance to the Central African Republic in its recovery efforts. The attempted coup d'état increased insecurity in the country. The number of illegally owned weapons — the collection of which was far from being completed when the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) ended — has increased sharply as a result of the events of 28 May. There is now such a proliferation of light weapons in Bangui and in the provinces that incidents of armed robbery in

the capital and attacks on the highways in the interior of the country are more frequent. In order to ensure that security and peace are restored in the Central African Republic, it is absolutely essential to assist the Government in its efforts to collect arms and to implement its redeployment plan. I invite the different partners to assist the State agencies responsible for disarmament, whose performance has been far from effective due to a lack of resources. Such assistance could take the form of:

(a) Financial assistance to compensate owners of illegal weapons;

(b) Provision of experts in disarmament;

(c) Assistance for the redeployment plan.

18. Assistance to the Central African Republic in the area of security also encompasses the restructuring of the defence and security forces. The appointment of a Minister responsible for restructuring following the cabinet reshuffle of 30 August 2001 underlines the priority that the authorities assign to this question. It should be recalled that not all the pledges made at the special donor meeting in New York in May 2000 have been honoured. I would like to take this opportunity to thank those States that have already fulfilled their commitments. Like the Security Council, I call upon the other partners who had made similar commitments to honour them. The situation in the Central African Republic calls for the continued and improved restructuring of the armed forces in order to create a climate that would enable them to fulfil their role under the Constitution of the Republic and to promote the establishment of lasting peace in the country. Bilateral and multilateral donors might therefore wish to assist the Central African authorities to:

(a) Rehabilitate existing military facilities and build new barracks;

(b) Redeploy units to the interior of the country, including through the provision of light duty vehicles;

(c) Recruit, train and equip at least two contingents to make up for the shortage of military personnel since the events of 28 May.

19. Assistance to the Central African Republic in the area of security also concerns the police and gendarmerie which, like the army, must be given substantial support. The shortcomings of these forces in the area of staffing, training, methods of work and respect for the law partly explain the prevailing insecurity in Bangui and in the provinces, as well as the human rights violations that are frequently reported to the Office. If the Central African Republic is to be successful in its efforts to promote the rule of law, then its police force and gendarmerie must have acceptable working conditions. That is why I wish to encourage, in this respect also, all partners concerned to provide special assistance to the authorities:

(a) Through diverse forms of logistical support (teaching equipment and miscellaneous materials for training schools; rehabilitation of infrastructure);

(b) Through financing the initial training of 200 police officers and 200 gendarmes.

20. Owing to the linkage between the restoration of peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and stability in the Central African Republic, I wish to draw the Council's attention to the subregional dimension of the situation in the Central African Republic. That is why I have requested my representatives in Kinshasa and Bangui to continue to work closely together by exchanging information, and taking joint and any other initiatives likely to promote the restoration of peace and security in this part of the continent.

21. Assistance should also be provided to the media of the Central African Republic. Both the public- and private-sector media suffer from a crucial lack of resources, which considerably hampers their vital role in a democratic system. Specifically, the training programmes already being implemented by BONUCA should be strengthened through logistical support from bilateral and multilateral partners aimed at enabling the Central African media to carry out their tasks properly.

B. Strengthening of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in the Central African Republic

22. In requesting me to submit recommendations to it, the Council asked me to pay particular attention to the strengthening of BONUCA. Due to the prevailing situation in the country since the attempted coup d'état, consideration needs to be given to strengthening the mandate of the Office in order to enhance its effectiveness and the visibility of its activities by increasing its resources and capabilities, strengthening

its administrative capacities and making available to the Office a level of resources commensurate with its revised mandate.

23. With regard to the strengthening of its activities, the Office, in cooperation with agencies of the United Nations system in the country, will pursue its overall mission of peace-building. In that regard, and in the light of recent events, it will focus on:

(a) Bringing about political dialogue and national reconciliation;

(b) Monitoring the security situation;

(c) Ensuring respect for and the promotion of human rights;

(d) Providing political support for the mobilization of resources with a view to the economic reconstruction of the country.

24. The lack of political dialogue created a situation of permanent tension which was aggravated by the attempted coup d'état. In that regard, the Office should play a more active role in efforts to bring the ruling majority and the opposition closer together with a view to strengthening democratic institutions.

25. As a result of the climate of insecurity in the capital and elsewhere in the country, as well as other indicators of instability, the activities of BONUCA should be reviewed and strengthened in order to enable it to have a genuine early-warning capacity. Moreover, the Office will play a catalytic role in the collection of arms, restructuring of the army and training of military personnel alongside other agencies of the system, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which will be responsible for implementing the redeployment plan.

26. The attempted coup d'état adversely affected the human rights situation. There have been constant reports to the Office of serious violations of human rights, including violations of the right to life. The flood of requests received by the human rights section during and after the events of 28 May sharply highlighted the limited resources of BONUCA in the area of human rights monitoring and investigation of individual cases. In that regard, the strengthening of the Office's mandate should lead to strengthening of its investigation and training activities and to the extension of these activities within the country and assistance to the Central African judicial system and assistance from the United Nations system and other partners. In this regard, the human and financial resources of the Office should be considerably increased. The budget of BONUCA for next year, which I will be presenting to the General Assembly, will reflect this increase.

27. As far as support for the economic recovery of the Central African Republic is concerned, the Council stressed in the statement by its President dated 17 July 2001 the crucial importance of poverty eradication and the need for an enhanced international effort to help in the recovery of the Central African Republic. The role of BONUCA in this context will consist of pursuing, together with the resident coordinator of the United Nations system, efforts to mobilize resources. In that regard, the relations of the Office with the representatives of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank should be more interactive, especially with respect to institutional support for public administration and the Central African financial departments.

28. In the light of these proposals, I wish to propose to the Council that the mandate of BONUCA be strengthened. The principal mission of the Office will be to support the efforts of the authorities and of other sectors of Central African society to achieve national reconciliation and create a political environment that is conducive to peace and development. To this end, its activities will be aimed at promoting political dialogue and cooperation between Government authorities and civil society with a view to strengthening the nation's democratic institutions. The Office will also advise and provide technical assistance to the Government in the areas of security and restructuring of the defence forces. With the assistance of other agencies of the United Nations system, it will also play an active role in promoting disarmament. In addition, it will pay special attention to the human rights situation and, lastly, take appropriate initiatives and provide every possible political assistance to other initiatives for mobilizing the resources needed to achieve economic recovery and combat poverty.

29. In the light of the foregoing and within the framework of a global peace-building strategy adopted by the agencies of the United Nations system represented in the Central African Republic, I propose that the mandate of BONUCA, as set out in the letter dated 3 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the Security Council (S/1999/1235) and

the statement by the President of the Security Council dated 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/5), should be:

(a) At the political level, to:

(i) Monitor the political situation in the country;

(ii) Support initiatives and efforts aimed at strengthening national unity and promoting national reconciliation and, to this end, provide the necessary support for the effective implementation of the provisions of the 1998 National Reconciliation Pact and the effective functioning of the Monitoring and Arbitration Committee;

(iii) Together with the Government, political parties and civil society, work towards the strengthening of democratic institutions and, to this end, take such steps as are needed to advance the democratic process in the Central African Republic;

(iv) Contribute to the political and social dialogue and, to this end, use its good offices, offer its services as a mediator, if necessary, and strengthen national capacities in the area of the prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes.

(b) In the area of security, to:

(i) Monitor the military and security situation in the country;

(ii) Support any initiative to promote the restructuring of the defence and security forces and to support the national development and redeployment plan;

(iii) With the assistance of other agencies of the United Nations system, promote the implementation of an effective arms-collection programme;

(iv) Implement, for the benefit of the armed forces, a programme of education for a culture of peace and respect for the institutions of the Republic;

(v) Contribute to the mobilization of the external resources needed for the restructuring of the defence and security forces and for the redeployment of interested military personnel.

(c) In the area of civilian police, to:

(i) Monitor the public security situation in the country;

(ii) Support the efforts of the Government to provide training for the national police and gendarmerie;

(iii) Provide technical assistance to the competent police and gendarmerie authorities in the area of public order and crime control;

(d) In the area of human rights, to:

(i) Monitor the human rights situation through observation, investigation and judicial assistance to victims;

(ii) Contribute to national capacity-building in the area of respect for and promotion of human rights through implementation of human rights education and training programmes targeted to all sectors of society, including law enforcement officers both in the capital and in the interior of the country;

(iii) Support the activities of United Nations agencies and other partners aimed at strengthening the judicial system and the rule of law.

(e) In the area of economic recovery, to:

(i) Provide, within the framework of a global peace-building strategy, political support for the efforts of the Resident Coordinator and United Nations agencies to promote national reconstruction, combat poverty and promote good governance;

(ii) Contribute actively to the international mobilization of political support and the necessary resources for the implementation of the social and economic programmes agreed upon with the Bretton Woods institutions.

30. Should the members of the Council approve these new tasks and the proposals made for strengthening BONUCA, I suggest that the mandate of the Support Office be extended for an additional year. The current mandate will expire on 31 December 2001. Unless the Council requests otherwise, I will continue to keep its members informed by submitting every six months a report on developments in the situation in the Central African Republic, in accordance with the statement by

the President of the Council dated 10 February 2000 (S/PRST/2000/5). The next report on the activities of BONUCA will be submitted to the Security Council in December 2001.

IV. Observations

31. Should the Council approve in principle, the implementation of the revised mandate of the Office would naturally require a significant increase in the resources of BONUCA, that is to say, an increase in its human, financial and material resources commensurate with the new activities being envisaged. Strengthening of the human rights section would enable the Office to discharge its expanded mandate for observation, investigation, training and the provision of judicial assistance made necessary by the situation that has arisen as a result of the attempted coup d'état. In light of the lessons learned from this failed coup attempt, the establishment of an early warning system to alert my Representative is also of critical importance. The Office should therefore have the capacity for action that is required for this purpose.

32. In my last report to the Council, I stressed that, in the final analysis, poverty is the breeding ground for the instability that exists in the Central African Republic and that it is largely as a result of the financial difficulties of the State that the political and economic situation has become so precarious. I wish to stress once again that the attempted coup d'état of 28 May has worsened the situation to the point where the Central African Republic is in a particularly desperate situation.

33. This exceptional situation requires exceptional assistance from the international community if, as the Council has urged, the international community genuinely wishes to assist the Central African Republic in its economic recovery efforts. This is why throughout this report I have recommended that assistance be provided to the Central African Republic in virtually every area. Such assistance is necessary because of the country's exceptional situation, its state of poverty, the weakness of its structures, its limited resources and its strategic position within central Africa and the Great Lakes region. It is because of the exceptional nature of this situation that I have invited the Bretton Woods institutions to show exceptional solicitude towards the Central African Republic, whose courageous efforts to bring about economic recovery have just suffered such a severe setback as a result of the recent coup attempt.

34. I therefore once again urge the international community and the development partners of the Central African Republic to be generous in their assistance to this country. In this connection, I welcome the intention of the authorities of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to continue their commitment to the Central African Republic. I therefore hope that the meeting to be held in Paris from 24 September, which the Prime Minister of the Central African Republic will attend, will lead to the establishment of a new macroeconomic framework that is conducive to development in the Central African Republic. I hope also and above all that the donor meeting that will follow will provide an opportunity for the international community to give tangible expression of this much needed solidarity towards the Central African Republic.

United Nations S/2001/887

Security Council

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18 September 2001
English
Original: French

Letter dated 18 September 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1363 (2001) of 30 July 2001 concerning Afghanistan. In paragraph 3 of that resolution, the Council requested me to establish, in consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), within 30 days of the adoption of the resolution and for a period running concurrently with the application of the measures imposed by resolution 1333 (2000), a mechanism: (a) to monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000); (b) to offer assistance to States bordering the territory of Afghanistan under Taliban control and other States, as appropriate, to increase their capacity regarding the implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000); and (c) to collate, assess, verify wherever possible, report and make recommendations on information regarding violations of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000).

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, in consultation with the Committee and taking into account the requirements stated in resolution 1363 (2001), I have appointed the following five experts to serve on the Monitoring Group in New York, in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution:

Mr. Michael Chandler (United Kingdom)
Mr. Philippe Graver (France)
Mr. Amod Gurung (Nepal)
Mr. Ashraf Mohsen Mohamed Mohsen (Egypt)
Mr. Daniel Yorks (United States of America)

I have also selected Mr. Michael Chandler to chair the Monitoring Group.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

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United Nations S/2001/888

Security Council

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Letter dated 18 September 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith two letters from President Saddam Hussein, President of the Republic of Iraq, addressed to the American peoples and the Western peoples and their Governments concerning what happened in the United States of America on 11 September 2001.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Al-Douri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex I to the letter dated 18 September 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Open letter from Saddam Hussein to the American peoples and the Western peoples and their Governments

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Once again, we would like to comment on what happened in the United States on 11 September 2001 and its consequences. Although we commented on it the day after its occurrence and what we said then represents the essence of our position regarding this and other matters, the aftermath of what happened in the United States and in the West in particular and the world in general requires every leader who understands the meaning of his responsibility towards his people and his nation and towards humanity in general to follow those consequences so that he may weigh their significance and on the basis of them establish the positions of his country and his people, not considering the incident in isolation.

When the incident occurred, Arab leaders and the rulers of those countries whose peoples are of the Islamic faith hastened to condemn the incident and the Westerners hastened, within hours, to issue statements and adopt decisions, some of them dangerous, in solidarity with the United States and against terrorism, according to what was in their statements and decisions. Even before being sure, those Western Governments decided to join forces with the United States, even if that meant declaring war on the party proven to be involved in what had happened in the United States. It would be natural for us to say that the explanation of the situation is in accordance with what has been said or relates to actions carried out by the United States formerly against specific States. It would suffice for some of those who carried out the operation to have come from the territory of a State named by the United States or to have been sent by someone whom the United States says instigated the operation for United States says and Western military retaliation to begin against the so-called "aggression". We do not know if they would do the same if any of those who carried out and planned the operation were present in, lived in or bore the nationality of a Western State or whether the intention was already formed and the design made against an Islamic party. It is most probable from the beating of the media war drums that the clear intent of the United States and certain Western Governments is to target a party that comes exclusively within the scope of Islam.

What happened in the United States was an extraordinary event, not a simple one. According to figures announced by official United States sources or spread by the media, the number of victims is great. With regard to the rallying of forces, the use of force, the infliction of destruction and suffering on the basis of supposition, or even on the basis of a whim, and the possibility of United States missiles and aircraft crossing the Atlantic to inflict damage and injury on whomsoever the United States decides, whether out of anger or out of greed or at the instigation of zionism, no one doubts or denies the capabilities of the United States and the West on that point. Many countries have suffered from United States technological might, and many people recognize that it has killed hundreds of thousands or even millions of human beings in their countries.

What happened in the United States was an extraordinary event, not a simple one. For the first time, someone crosses to the United States to unleash the fire of his anger inside it, as indicated by what was said in the media, on the assumption that the source of the act lay abroad. Since the incident was unprecedented, is it wise to deal with it by conventional means that are within the capacity of anyone who has the same technical and scientific capabilities as the United States and the West?

If the goal or the target is one or more of the Islamic countries, as is put about by the media and the intelligence services of some Western countries, that would be the same direction in which the United States and the West have always directed their fire, even when they wish to test a new weapon.

We repeat: will the problem be resolved by directing the fire of United States weapons at a specific goal and inflicting suffering or damage on it, with the support of Western Governments and on the basis of a fabricated story?

Will this achieve security for the United States and the world? Or is not the use of force by the United States and certain Western States against others in the world, including, or in the forefront, Arabs and Muslims, the main cause of instability in the world today? Is not the evil that befell the United States on 11 September 2001 anything other than the result of this and other acts?

This is the basic question, and this is what the United States administration and the administrations of Western Governments should answer first of all, and what Western public opinion should answer, with deliberation and responsibility, not by emotional reaction and following the same old methods that the United States has used against the world.

We said on 12 September 2001 that no one had crossed the Atlantic to the United States carrying weapons before this incident except the Westerners who went over and established the United States of America. Only the United States of America has crossed the Atlantic bearing weapons of destruction and death against the world. Here we wish to ask a question. Wasn't the use of United States weapons, including nuclear bombs against Japan, enough for the United States, prior to 11 September 2001, to be prepared to see them used in a heavier and more intensive way? Or isn't using them irresponsibly and without justification like any oppressor force in the world what has made America the most hated country in the world, beginning with the third world, passing through the intermediate-stage world and arriving at the civilized world, as the world is divided up by the West, including the United States of America?

The security of the United States and the security of the world could be achieved if United States leaders and those who beat the drums for them among the leaders of the present time in the West or outside the West become rational and if the United States disengages itself from the evil alliance with zionism, which has been scheming to plunder the world and plunge it into blood and darkness by exploiting the United States and also some Western countries.

The American peoples are now in greater need than ever of someone to tell them the truth bravely and honestly as it is. They do not need fanfares and cheerleaders. If they wish to take a lesson from the incident so as to reach a real awakening, in spite of the enormity of what befell the United States. However, the world, including the rulers of the United States, should say all this to the American peoples, so that they may have the courage to tell the truth and act according to what

is right and not to what is wrong and to exercise their responsibility on the basis of truth, justice and rationality, not on the basis of passion, and in accordance with the spirit of chance and capability.

In addition, we say to the peoples of the United States that what happened on 11 September 2001 should be compared with what their Government and armies are doing to the world. By way of example and not exhaustive enumeration, international agencies have stated that more than one and a half million Iraqis have died as a result of the embargo imposed by the United States and by certain Western States, in addition to the tens of thousands who have died or been wounded in the military operations that have been and are being carried out by the United States with its allies against Iraq. Hundreds of bridges, churches, mosques, colleges, schools, factories, palaces and hotels and thousands of private houses have been destroyed or damaged as a result of the United States-Western aerial bombardment that is still continuing to this day against Iraq. If you replay the film footage taken by the Western media itself, you will see that the images are no different from the images of the two buildings that were hit by the Boeing aircraft, if not more atrocious, particularly when the images are mingled with the remains of men, women and children. However, there is one difference, namely that those who direct missiles and bombs at their targets, whether from the United States or from another Western country, are usually directing them by remote control, and that is why they do so as if they were playing an amusing game. Those who acted on 11 September 2001 did it from close range and gave up their lives voluntarily, on the basis of an irrevocable determination. Why did they sacrifice their lives in this way?

According to Western documentation, when more than one and a half million out of a total of 25 million Iraqis die because of the embargo and United States aggression, that means that Iraq has lost more than one twenty-fifth of its people because of the United States aggression. Just as your beautiful skyscrapers were destroyed and caused you grief, beautiful buildings and precious homes were demolished over the heads of their owners in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq by United States weapons used by the Zionists. In just one place, which was a civilian shelter, namely the Ameriyah Shelter, more than 400 human beings — children and men and women, young and old — died in Iraq by United States weapons.

On the very day of the incident, 11 September 2001, a United States aircraft was practising aggression against Iraq and was shot down.

As for what is going on in Palestine, if zionism were to let you see on the television screens the bodies of the children, women and men killed daily with United States weapons and with United States support for the Zionist entity, that would alleviate the grief that you are feeling now.

Americans should know the pain that they have inflicted on the peoples of the world, so that, when they suffer, they will then find the right treatment and the right path.

All that has been inflicted on Arabs and Muslims by the United States and the West has not made Muslims become fanatics and harass Westerners walking the streets of Baghdad, Damascus, Tunis, Cairo and other Arab capitals, even when Westerners, and especially Americans, have insulted the holy sites of Muslims, including Arabs, by what is tantamount to occupation of the territory of Saudi Arabia in order to direct their evil fire against Baghdad. That their aircraft carriers

roam the Arabian Gulf and their aircraft its airspace in order to send tons of bombs and missiles against Iraq, so that some 200,000 tons of bombs have been dropped, not to mention the use of depleted uranium — all this is established and well known, not only to all Arabs and Muslims but also to the entire world. But because of just one incident that occurred in the United States on one day and on the basis of a so far unconfirmed accusation, there has been open and public harassment of Arabs and Muslims in the United States and in certain Western countries, including harassment of some United States nationals. Some Western States are preparing to participate in a United States military action, and the indications are that it will be against an Islamic country. Who, in this case, are the fanatics?

Is not this solidarity and the blanket approval in advance by some Western leaders of military aggression against an Islamic State the height of the fanaticism of the new crusade? It reminds Arabs and Muslims of the crusade waged by the West and NATO against Iraq.

Finally, if you, rulers, respect and cherish the blood of your peoples, why do you find it easy to shed the blood of other people, including Arabs and Muslims? If you have values, why don't you respect what is holy to Arabs and Muslims?

The United States needs wisdom, not force. It and the West have used force to its utmost and have found after a time that force does not achieve what they sought. Will the rulers try wisdom just for once so that their people and the world can live in security and stability?

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate:

> "Invite all to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching, and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious, for the Lord knoweth best those who have strayed from His path and those who accept guidance."

Almighty God speaks the truth.

Annex II to the letter dated 18 September 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Second open letter from Saddam Hussein to the American peoples and the Western peoples and their Governments

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Once again we comment on the incident that took place in America on 11 September 2001, not solely because of its significance in itself but because of the implications surrounding it and its ramifications at the world level, for we are a part of the world, or rather a special case in it as a nation known for what it is and for the basis and uniqueness of its faith.

We have said on previous occasions that the United States needs to try wisdom, having tried force for 50 years or more. We still believe that this is the most important advice that the world must give to the United States should anyone make a statement or adopt a position concerning this incident, if he is concerned about the security and stability of the world. This is the case if the United States and the world are convinced that what happened came to the United States from without, not from within.

It is a well-known axiom in law, general norms, dealings, social life and even political life that any accusation must be based on evidence, if the one making the accusation wishes or is keen to convince others — nay, if he respects the one listening to the accusation or has even a minimal sense of duty. However, the United States has launched the accusation before being sure and before having in its possession the minimum evidence for such a charge. It has not even given itself an opportunity to verify things first. It has started a drive of incitement and threat or talks irresponsibly of expanding the list of States, parties and persons accused. United States officials have set about making accusations or giving a free hand to the guided media, the Zionist media and its symbols inside and outside the administration in order to prepare the minds of the public for the charge. What does this mean?

In brief, it means that the United States gives no heed to the law and does not rely on it. It has no concern for opposing opinions, in accordance with its dangerous policy in this and other matters. Thus, you find it taking no pains to secure proof. Accordingly, it does not need evidence either in order to issue its verdict. It is content with saying something and passing verdicts, whether others besides United States officials are convinced or not. This means that, in keeping with the policy it has pursued since 1990, it has no regard for the opinion of the peoples and Governments of the world as a whole. It gives no weight or consideration to them, although it regards itself as the number one democratic State in the world. The fundamental meaning of democracy, even on the basis of its initial emergence in the Western world, is that facts should be laid before the people, so that the people may assume its responsibility with full awareness. Our description of the United States attitude regarding this incident is a practical one, i.e. United States officials do not even respect the opinion of their peoples, let alone world opinion. Indeed, by acting in this way United States officials are deluding their peoples and beating the spurious media drums to do the job of mobilizing them against an enemy or enemies

against whom no evidence has been brought. That is because what concerns the officials there is to foment the hostility of the peoples of the United States against those they had assumed to be enemies prior to the incident. The taxpayer would be in a position in which he would have to accept the blackmail traps laid for him by the arms manufacturers, in addition to interested interference at the level of senior military and civilians officials.

It may be argued that political verdicts do not always emanate from the same principles or procedures followed by the judiciary or the criminal courts and that precedents and background data might suffice for arrival at a conclusion that might be correct. Even if, for the sake of argument, we were to go along with this notion, we would say that this could be true about media and media propaganda statements and even some political statements. In this instance error might not necessarily be fatal.

But is this permissible in war?

Once more we say that war is not an ordinary situation and neither is it routine in the life of nations and peoples. It is an absolutely exceptional situation. In such a situation evidence based on deduction is not sufficient, even if it is strong, for the launching of an accusation against a party or a number of parties or a State or a number of States to the point where the one launching the accusation declares war on the accused party or parties. He bears the responsibility for whatever harm may be sustained by his own people or by the other party, including death, the destruction of property and resulting grave consequences, in addition to the fact that the United States administration has directed an accusation at a specific religion, not merely against a specific nationality.

Let us also accept the interventions of those who say that the United States has not said this through its senior officials specifically and that some of its officials have denied that it is their policy to make an accusation against a given religion. However, the lack of evidence to back up the accusation and the lack of respect for the sound golden rule of legally valid accusation, leading to a declaration of war and restricting the charge to a nation, States, designations and individuals specifically can only be understood as indicating that, the charge is premeditated; there is no evidence that the action was carried out by Muslims. This is complemented by free reins for the media to give currency to this and to prepare public opinion to accept it or become attuned to it, so that anything opposed to it would sound a note of discord. Here is the list: Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden, the Islamic Qa`i dah, Syria, Yemen, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. The list may be curtailed or enlarged according to the expediency of the power policy that has found its opportunity or the power that seeks its opportunity to declare war. Whether the names on the list are increased on this basis or cut down, what does this mean but an accusation against Muslims, including Arabs or Arabs in the forefront? Why should this cross the minds of United States officials unless they have basically assumed themselves and their policy to be anti-Arab and anti-Muslim? Does this charge mean anything other than the desire to settle old scores, all based on the assumption that their foreign policy is incompatible with United States policy or that they do not give in to United States-Zionist policy on the world and on Palestine?

Consider statements by the United States officials who say that the war will be long because it is aimed at a number of States. Note the blackmail or rather the terrorism intended by them, whereby they mean to place a number of States and

parties on a longer or shorter list, in accordance with the policy of sheer terrorism and blackmail and first and foremost the vain assumption that Arabs and Muslims, including the people of Palestine, would leave the arena to the aggression of the Zionist entity and its vile imperialism.

These charges that were made with due consideration and in an instantaneous way mean that the mentality of the United States administration was pre-loaded, prior to the incident, even if we applied the norms of today and not the norms of the law. It has made an assumption tantamount to a conclusive verdict, namely that Islam, with Arab Muslims in the lead, are enemies of the United States. More precisely, the United States, at the level of its leaders, has taken it as a final verdict that it is the enemy of Arabs and Muslims. In so doing, they have stored the final verdict in their minds. On this basis, they built their preparation in advance. On this basis too they prepared the software of the computer whose schemes are pre-programmed on this assumption, which has taken the form of a final verdict. This reminds us of the free rein given to political writers and so-called "intellectuals", including former heads of States and ministers, whom Zionist policy over the past 10 or 15 years has sought to convince that faith based on the Islamic religion and what emanates from it is the new enemy of the United States and the West. This is backdrop against which United States rulers act, with the participation of some Western rulers who have come under the pressure and influence of Zionist thought and Zionist schemes.

Obviously, this assumption is no longer simply an assumption for the purpose of scrutiny, testing and verification. It has become part and parcel of conclusive verdicts. That is why the charge was instantaneous, without consideration or the emergence of evidence to form a basis for it and for the presupposition to rest on in order to become a conclusive verdict. This charge has been directed not against all Governments in the Islamic and Arab States but against all Islamic peoples, including the Arab nation, and the designations, parties, States and Governments whose policies do not please the United States, or whose policy and positions in particular are unpalatable to the United States, or because they call for the liberation of Palestine, a halt to United States aggression against Iraq and pride in the independence and the heritage of their nation.

Anyone who is surprised at this realistic conclusion, allowing courteous phrases said on the margin of verdicts to be substituted for it, should consider our words. The United States has declared it is at war. It has been gearing for war since the first moment following the incident, as though it were the opportunity those concerned had been waiting for. It has allocated the necessary funds for war, or a portion of them. Have you ever heard or read in near or remote history of a State declaring war before naming its enemy? Does this not mean that the United States had designated its enemy before the declaration of war and that the opportunity to declare a state of war came with the incident that befell it. It is not yet known whether it was carried out by an outside enemy or from inside. Thus, the war declared by the United States would cease to be the reason for the incident. Rather it is the incident that has provided the opportunity to wage the war, which was not, in any case, a result of the incident.

One might contend that it is the nature of the incident and the scale of the pain felt by United States officials as a result of what their peoples suffered, the embarrassment they felt owing to the suffering that hit their people, which was not

due to the incident alone but also to exposure of the failure of the authorities concerned, which were preoccupied with hatching conspiracies abroad and assassination and sabotage operations against the States and freedom-loving people of the world — that all this was what prompted United States rulers to rush to the point of hastily declaring war and naming the parties so that they would be obliged to launch the war. Here we say once again, if this was good reason and grounds to justify the charge and the subsequent decisions of the United States leaders with their well-known high-level titles, why should it not be grounds for others, at the level of those not bearing presidential, ministerial or similar titles? Has anyone asked or been concerned about this? Will anyone ask himself what if those persons had had children, brothers, mothers and fathers who had been killed by United States conspiracies, plots and wars against peoples, in the forefront the Islamic peoples? And what if they or the people of their nation had had buildings and factories demolished and holy sites violated? This is if the charge was directed abroad.

If the incident occurred as a result of rage and not of premeditated planning and gives rise to decisions of war at this high level inside the United States, why should you not expect someone to direct his fire at it under the pressure of similar or graver considerations?

Once again we say that the United States Administration and those in the West who have allied themselves with it against Arabs and Muslims, nay, against the world, now and in the past, in all the arenas that have witnessed the scourges of the alliance, need to let themselves be guided to the path of wisdom, after having had power at their disposal and deploying it to the point where it has ceased to frighten those who experience it. Dignity, the sovereignty of the homeland and the freedom of the believer are sacred, along with other sacred things in which true Muslims believe, including Arabs, or rather Arabs in the forefront.

If this is a realistic description of the premeditated intentions that determine war against Arabs and Muslims and if the party making that determination expects a cover for its declaration of war, which it may launch against those for whom it has been biding its time, is there anything that can avert it save the will of the one God, the living, the eternal, the almighty, and anything save the will of the peoples when they become fully aware, once they know and fear God and believe in him?

"For us Allah suffices, and He is the best disposer of affairs."

It remains for us to express an opinion. We believe that it is timely. It too is directed to the peoples of the United States and the Western peoples generally. Zionism has been planning for domination over the world since its famous conference held at Basle, Switzerland, in 1897. Ever since it has been working in this direction. It has scored palpable successes by its control over financial, media and commercial centres in your countries and over whoever rules in your name, here or there in decision-making centres. But its domination is so far not yet fully achieved so as to make its will absolute and final. This could only happen if it induced a conflict between the two revealed religions that are followed by the biggest bloc in the world. Otherwise zionism would be denied the fulfilment of all its ambitions. The masterminds of zionism are therefore working for a clash between Christianity and Islam on the assumption — may it be frustrated — that only thereby can they realize the opportunity to dominate the world, as new opportunities for domination open up before them. Is there anything better for the thieving dog

than to find his household preoccupied by grief so that it can seize the thing it has set its eye on, the thing that whetted its appetite? Are sensible persons in the West aware of this? Or will zionism outsmart them to attain its aims?

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Report by the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representative of the United States of America on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 18 September 2001 by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, stating that Mr. John D. Negroponte has been appointed representative of the United States of America on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

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